In a sobering 2002 article, Thomas Carothers debunked many of the notions surrounding the validity of the democratization paradigm and illustrated the problems that emerge with studying political change in authoritarian contexts only through the prism of transitology. This is due to the liberalizations that occurred in the Arab world over the last two decades. Thus, the concept of semi-democracy has been applied Francesco.cavatorta@dcu.ie
name of rule of law and political pluralism, have reinforced corrupt networks of patronage in which new economic elites linked to the authoritarian state apparatus derive significant rents.
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The literature therefore has oscillated from democracy-spotting to studying authoritarian persistence. However, the current focus on the authoritarian reality of the Arab world should not obscure the fact that real political, economic and social changes have occurred in the region with a significant impact on governance, suggesting that there have been many changes within the continuity.
13 Thus, while political rule has remained essentially authoritarian, the social coalitions supporting the regimes and the economic and social structures and the means through which the ruling elites control their countries have changed significantly. Paradoxically, the thread of all these changes is the introduction of liberal reforms. As Heydemann points out, 'Arab regimes have conceded the commanding heights of authoritarian rule, opened limited space for civil societies, permitted opposition parties to operate more freely, broadened press freedoms, and acknowledged the legitimacy of human rights.'
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In 1997 Fareed Zakaria argued that we were witnessing the rise of illiberal democracies, a form on government of successful 'dysfunctional equilibrium' where This indicates that political rule has shifted away from traditional forms of authoritarianism. More crucially, the way in which authoritarian regimes in the region transformed themselves while retaining an authoritarian core points to the fact that Arab regimes are not 'exceptional' because there is a generalized move towards liberal authoritarianism across the globe.
12 Steven Heydemann (ed.) (2004) , Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: the Politics of Economic Reform Revisited (London: Palgrave).
13 Holger Albrecht & Oliver Schlumberger (2004) 'Waiting for Godot': Regime change without democratization in the Middle East, ' International Political Science Review, 25, 4, 14 Heydemann, 'Upgrading Authoritarianism,' p. 2.
constitutional liberalism is marginalized and mechanic democratic procedures take center stage. 15 The concept of illiberal democracy suffers from a number of theoretical problems,
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The starting point of this study is the hypothesis that the expected convergence toward a liberal-democratic model might not occur because of the weakening of liberal-democracy itself over the last few decades. This might then point to a different future convergence.
but in the Arab context it was updated in Brumberg's definition of 'liberalized autocracy,'
which is suited better to describe Arab political systems. Such systems display a degree of pluralism and liberal rights, although the core of political power is out of reach and unaccountable, rendering many of these liberal rights quite meaningless. Thus, as mentioned above, what we have to contend with is a 'new' political system that currently is studied in its own right. While it is certainly a worthwhile enterprise to discover the ways in which Arab regimes have been able to survive in power through the introduction of both political and economic liberal measures, there is an absence of comparative work on how such reforms fit in with political developments outside the region and, more precisely, in established and new democracies where significant changes also have occurred over the last few decades. By taking a broader comparative perspective, what emerges is a complex picture of the shifting nature of governance in both democracies and authoritarian systems. De-politicization is a core feature of authoritarianism and is to be expected in semiauthoritarian systems.
18 Thus, while the ability to enjoy a degree of liberal rights is a welcome development in Arab polities, the inability to have a voice in the political system saps the enthusiasm with which the liberal reforms are received because the decisions taken do not reflect what might be considered an emerging popular will. The scope of reforms in the Arab world has changed many of the aspects of traditional authoritarianism and permitted a greater space for society without, however, modifying the nature of decision-making at the highest levels of government. This has produced a society where 'change' is quite visible and where the exterior signs of modernity are present, but where meaningful accountability is absent. For instance, the opening up of civil society space has guaranteed new individual liberal rights to some social groups such as women, as Julie Pruzan Jørgensen highlights in her contribution to this special issue. Also, the crass intimidation of journalists and the monopoly on information to a large extent has ceased, and, while there are still cases of journalists being severely harassed, the press is generally freer and there is increased access to information from a range of different media with important repercussion on how issues are debated.
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undermines fundamentally the liberal reforms undertaken because democracy understood as the sovereignty, however partial, of citizens on political decisions concerning the whole polity is absent. The inability to have meaningful access and the sentiment that liberal reforms do not truly equate with genuine change de-politicize the citizenry, which ultimately switches off from political engagement and either refrains from participating or finds alternative ways of engaging that might be less overtly political. It is this retreat from politics rather than the massive use of repression that helps the rulers of liberalized autocracies to remain in power because they have obtained the de-structuration of society and perpetuated their power as a consequence.
Examples of de-politicization from the Arab world abound. are at the mercy of global forces over which they have no control, increasing the 'distance' between rulers and ruled. This widespread de-politicization has allowed current Arab rulers to remain in power while also presenting a façade of successful ongoing democratization.
The de-politicization occurring in the Arab world is, for some, a temporary phenomenon linked to the stalling of reforms and therefore the success of liberalized autocracy is limited in time. Such scholars still hold that 'the proposition that autocracies have achieved a new lease on life and are emerging today as a viable alternative…is wrong.'
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They still believe that there will be a convergence of these regimes toward the established and dominant liberal democracies, but they fail to take into account the de-structuration and depoliticization of society that have become key features of democracies, making them not only less 'democratic,' but also less appealing as models. The transformation of governance in the authoritarian Arab world has occurred in parallel with the transformation of governance in democracies, suggesting that the semi-authoritarian limbo might not be temporary, as other countries are converging toward that. As van Kersbergen states, 'on the one hand…we have witnessed the increasing esteem, legitimacy, and triumph of democracy as a regime throughout the world, while, on the other hand, we have been observing an increasing dissatisfaction with politics, and the loss of confidence in the performance of government in new and established democracies.'
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The de-politicization of the polity is one of the reasons why liberalized autocracies survive. It follows that the teleology of democratization comes into doubt, as such depoliticization is not confined to the Arab world or liberalised autocracies; it is also a defining trait of liberal democracies. It is at this juncture that the argument of convergence of governance toward liberal-democracy or 'the end of history' falters. Thus, the current governance practices in the Arab world might be the future of governance for a number, if not all, of today's liberal-democratic regimes.
… Downgraded Democracy Elsewhere
The phenomenon of de-politicization is a significant development of political life in liberal where the 'thirst' for participation should be at peak levels, given the previous inability to cast meaningful votes under authoritarian rule. There are certainly cases of new democracies where the enthusiasm for politics is still manifested in high turnouts, but we have many more cases where this is not the case.
28 The downward trend of turnout across new and established democracies is particularly worrying because it no longer is confined to the 'usual suspects' who never turned out, but it is affecting an increasing number of citizens. 
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A third trend has to do with the quality of information that citizens receive and how the information is processed. Citizens in liberal democracies enjoy freedom of information and have access to an almost unlimited amount of media. They therefore are exposed to an enormous mass of information and should be able to make informed political decisions.
However, the amount of information is not necessarily linked to quality, and ordinary citizens It is interesting to note that in earlier times it was political parties in democracies that packaged information and presented it to citizens. While the information was certainly partisan, citizens were not alone in the face of it because there was a wider ideological context which would make sense of a complex reality, and authoritarian systems provided unifying narratives. With the diminishing trust in political parties, media and politicians, this mechanism of transmission of information does not exist any longer. We therefore now witness, for instance, the presidentialization of politics, even in parliamentary systems where the attention is concentrated on the leader and his personality and 'likability.' This does not mean that the whole citizenry is poorly informed and makes choices simply based on how likeable a candidate is, but the increasing attention on the personality of candidates and leaders rather than on issues is a new development that we need to consider.
The mechanisms of information therefore are broadly similar across systems, but knowledge seems no longer to matter.
Where information is poor, the personalization of politics occurs more frequently, coupled with another perception: the idea that a single leader will be able to 'put the country right.' This has led to a dramatic increase in populism, driven by a focus on personality rather than policies. It should be noted that some analysts do not perceive these trends as problematic,
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From this picture it emerges that a similar disenchantment of citizens toward the state, public representatives and political institutions affects both liberal-democracies and liberalized autocracies. This is, however, not the only similarity between the two systems of government. Much like democracies are afflicted by diseases that are normally associated with de-structured societies governed through arbitrary norms, liberalized autocracies display traits and characteristics that one would normally associate with democratic governments.
There are two of these that seem particularly significant. First of all, liberalized autocracies are qualitatively different from the ideal type of dictatorships where the dictator is solely in charge. Liberalized autocracies are successful because they are not like that; quite the contrary they derive legitimacy and support from a wide range of social groups and the ability to deliver material and 'moral' resources to such groups empowers them and enables them to while others go as far as to argue that a permanently mobilized citizenry is detrimental to democratic decision-making because it would cause too much stress on the political institutions. This view might be procedurally correct in the sense that apathy and low participation do not necessarily invalidate the results of elections. However, if one takes a more substantive definition of democratic governance, the absence of widespread support for the system or the belief that individual citizens cannot have a meaningful say in decisionmaking fundamentally weakens the democratic covenant. Finally, if one perceives democratic institutions simply as loci to be penetrated to obtain advantages for a specific goal limited in time, the credibility of democracy as a set of practices to determine the common good diminishes considerably. survive. 44 Secondly, public opinion plays a role in decision-making in the liberalized autocracies through a number of informal channels that convey to the leadership the type of choices that citizens largely will tolerate and the ones that are to be wholly rejected wholly. In conclusion, there is a pattern of convergence at play between liberalized autocracies and established democracies, but they are not converging where Fukuyama expected.
Marxist Neo-Dependencia
Van Kersbergen acknowledges that 'the explanations for the disquieting reality in functioning democracies are manifold'
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Building on the literature about the 'death of partisanship,' a significant part of the explanation for this path toward the convergence of governance between liberalized autocracies and liberal democracies has to do with the acceleration of capitalist globalization that places all states under severe constraints. In its original enunciation the death of partisanship related to the idea that that 'rising levels of trade integration and capital mobility…combined with the increasing leverage of the international financial institutions significantly constrained the preferences of domestic actors,'
just like a number of authors emphasize the multiple reasons why a similar, and perhaps more justifiable, dissatisfaction with politics exists in the Arab world.
A number of works focus on the inadequacies of citizens themselves to take advantage of political opportunities. This might be partly true in democracies, but it is less so in the case of Arab regimes, although citizens in these states are also not immune from academic criticism usually in the form of culturalist arguments. 
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The Marxist informed dependencia theory of the 1970s, a largely forgotten approach in the early studies of globalization, is a useful framework when one examines the effects of the international capitalist system on domestic political structures. Adapting this approach to current political systems can shed some light on how the international and the domestic interact across different systems of government in order to move away from the exclusive focus on the absence of democracy and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world and instead to account for the changes that have occurred in a much broader perspective.
When stripped of its most ideological elements, 'dependency theory created a framework for analysis of Latin American political economy that invited the consideration of external factors
This means that we need to understand political systems outside the simplistic dichotomy of democracy and authoritarianism along a nice laid out path that takes countries from the latter to the former and instead we need to focus on attempting to account for the emergence of similar phenomena such as the ones under the rubric of de-politicization that affect all states and systems.
47 Susan Strange (1996) , The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
48 Adam Przeworski & Michael Wallerstein (1988) , 'Structural Dependence of the State on Capital, ' American Political Science Review, 83, 1, as well as internal ones,' 49 and starting from this premise it gave a prominent role to the capitalist economy in determining the fate of Latin American domestic politics. There are certainly a number of problems with dependency theory, but some of its assumptions need to be re-examined today. For example, it assumed the international capitalist structure forced a specific type of economic development in Latin America that required authoritarian political structures particularly because the needs of the bourgeoisie in Latin America only could be satisfied through authoritarian practices. Today's neo-dependecia, drawing more heavily from classical Marxism, is somewhat different because it not only addresses specific regional dynamics but also deals with more issues than simply underdevelopment. Instead it seeks to speak to the issue of de-politicization and convergence of governance. The argument is that the international political economy, structured around neo-liberal economics, places similar pressures on all national governments, which react to these structural pressures similarly although they have different degrees of capabilities to deal with such pressures. Despite these different capabilities, all national governments seem to have succumbed to the requirements of globalization, leaving very little room to manoeuvre for national policy-makers to try out alternative economic policies to deal with the increased 'vulnerability' of citizens exposed to the full force of globalization. First of all is the sentiment that ordinary citizens have of being deprived of any decision-making power regarding significant decisions related to economic policies and redistribution, which also affect a number of other policy areas because of economic externalities, including the state of public services or migration. The privation of clear decision-making power is due to both the nature of the international capitalist system and the pressure that leading actors in the system, including supranational organisations, apply. The leading powers in the international system push an agenda that reflects their narrow national interests, although they also suffer from structural constraints, leading to the manifestation of similar symptoms of de-politicization found in less powerful countries. With respect to supranational organisations, people perceive them to be taking binding decisions that countries must abide by despite the potential opposition of the vast majority of citizens who then feel that they have no say in how their state's affairs should be run.
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51 Ngaire Woods (2001) , 'IMF and World Bank: Questions of accountability, ' International Affairs, 77, 1, This is the 'democratic deficit' problem that most international organisations suffer from, although some scholars argue that such a deficit does not actually exist. Ultimately however the existence or absence of a democratic deficit is irrelevant, because what matters is the perception of its existence. Accordingly, what one has to investigate is how citizens perceive the procedures of decision-making that they have. In the last instance the fact that many ruling governments, be they democratic or not, utilize international organisations as scapegoats for decisions that they want to make but know are not popular does not invalidate the argument. In this case as well the de-politicization and absence of trust in public institutions are the outcome. This is highly problematic because it seems to point to the idea that the very entity 'state,' including the democratic state,
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Second is the problem of increasing inequalities that the neo-liberal economic system has created.
is ill-suited to deal with the challenges of globalization.
53 Rightly or wrongly, democracies traditionally have been associated with the necessity of decreasing inequalities either because of the mechanisms of decision-making which in theory involve all social groups or because of the in-built notion of equality that they have. However, income inequalities and inequalities in life-styles have been increasing on an unparalleled scale over the last three decades. This is problematic because it makes the political system responsible for addressing such inequalities that undermine access to political participation. When the system does not respond because the structure of the global economic pressures prevents it, the system as a whole loses credibility. In authoritarian regimes economic and social inequalities are believed to be in-built because in order to stay in power ruling elites have to privilege patterns of patronage that undermine any notion of equality, political or otherwise, but in democracies this is not perceived as being the case. In any case, the growth of income inequalities breeds both apathy and 'revolutionary' anger and, more significantly, it undermines the legitimacy of public representatives insofar as they are held to be colluding with powerful economic interests to the detriment of citizens. precisely such abuses of power and trust quite spectacularly have failed, and one can trace these failures to the process of 'de-regulation' or light touch regulation that international markets required. The significant 'distance' between the ruling elites and citizens that political science has assumed to be a specific trait of authoritarian countries where a wealthy and powerful minority usually rules over a less well-off majority and controls it through repressive measures increasingly seems to characterize liberal-democracies as well, with the consequent loss of credibility and appeal of liberal-democratic arrangements.
Finally, both democracies and liberalized autocracies suffer from the presence of systemic structural power, whereby key social groups usually linked to big business and international economic interests have a much higher degree of access to policy-makers and therefore have the power to influence the strategic direction of policy-making. 55 The ability of business in general to indicate the policies governments have to follow substantially has increased to the detriment in many cases of the achievements that social-democracy had obtained in the previous decades. political reactions of citizens to it have been the usual combination of resignation, apathy and populism.
Conclusion
The argument about disempowerment of ordinary citizens is not new and it has been a constant preoccupation of political theorists dealing both with democratic fatigue and authoritarianism. However, the increased globalization of the world economy under capitalist structures has heightened the problem of the state's autonomy and independence, restricting the menu of choices for policymakers, be they operating in liberal democracies or liberalized autocracies. Within this context it is not surprising that we witness a significant degree of depoliticization among citizens in both systems, leading them to converge at a point where a number of individual rights exist and where the formal institutions of democracies are present, but where the important policy decisions are taken in an unaccountable manner by selfserving political and economic elites. When analysed in the context of post-democratization, this leads one to question two assumptions. First of all, there is no certainty about transitions from authoritarian rule toward democracy and countries actually can get stuck somewhere on a continuum rather than making a progression or regression on a linear path. Second, liberal democracy as we know it might not in the end prevail as the system of government of all and the simplistic dichotomy of authoritarianism/democracy might no longer be useful in categorizing political systems across the globe. The suggestion here is that there is indeed a degree of convergence between liberalized autocracies and democracies, but it is one of widespread dissatisfaction with current forms of political organizations embodied in the phenomenon of de-politicization and its different manifestations. When it comes to the Arab world, this has very relevant implications because it forces scholars to look at these regimes in a broader perspective, given that the current liberal autocratic arrangements constitute an answer to challenges that are shared by all other countries in the international system. This undermines the notion of the exceptionalism of the Arab world when it comes to its form of political rule.
